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Corporate Aiding and Abetting of Human Rights 
Violations: Confusion in the Courts 
Doug Cassel* 
I. INTRODUCTION: TOO MANY QUESTIONS, TOO MANY ANSWERS 
¶1 Can transnational corporations or their executives be held criminally or civilly 
liable for aiding and abetting human rights violations committed by governments or 
militaries of foreign countries where they do business?  What body of law determines the 
answer -- international law, the law of the foreign state, or the law of the home state?   
¶2 If the answer is that corporations and their executives can be held liable, what 
standard defines “aiding and abetting” liability?  Does merely doing business in a 
repressive state qualify?  If a corporation sells goods or services to a repressive 
government, does the corporation aid or abet if it has knowledge that its products will be 
used to commit human rights violations?  Or must corporate officers intend to assist the 
commission of violations? 
¶3 For corporate executives, the answer to one question -- whether they can be held 
criminally liable as accessories to crimes against human rights -- has long been clear.  As 
early as 1946, for example, a British military court convicted the two top officials of the 
firm that supplied Zyklon B to the Nazi gas chambers as accessories to war crimes.1 
¶4 Beyond that modest marker, however, there is room for argument, and often active 
debate, about everything else.  To some extent the debate turns on whether international 
criminal law requires that those who aid and abet merely have knowledge of the principal 
crime, or must instead have a purpose to facilitate the crime.  In United States federal 
court suits against corporations under the Alien Tort Statute (“ATS”) ,2 this international 
law debate is compounded by a domestic dispute over whether the definition of “aiding 
and abetting” should be drawn from international law or from federal common law.  
Overlaying both debates is an even more basic disagreement about whether corporations 
can be held liable in tort for violations of international law at all.  The confusion 
engendered by these multi-layered debates denies legal certainty, both to corporations 
and to victims of human rights violations facilitated by corporations. 
¶5 The U.S. Supreme Court recently failed to muster a quorum in a case that might 
have clarified the extent of corporate liability for aiding and abetting under the ATS.3  
                                                 
* Professor of Law, Notre Dame Presidential Fellow, and Director, Center for Civil and Human Rights, 
Notre Dame Law School. 
1 See generally Trial of Bruno Tesch and Two Others (The Zyklon B Case), 1 Law Reports of Trials of War 
Crim. 93 (1947) (Brit. Mil. Ct., Hamburg, 1-8 March 1946); see also cases discussed infra Part II.A. 
2 Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2007) (providing that federal district courts "shall have original 
jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a 
treaty of the United States"). 
3 Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254 (2d Cir. 2007), aff’d for lack of quorum sub nom. 
American Isuzu Motors Inc. v. Lungisile Ntsebeza, 2008 U.S. LEXIS 3868 (May 12, 2008).  See discussion 
of this case infra Part III. 
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Even if the Court eventually gives new guidance, however, many unanswered questions 
would remain beyond its reach.  What civil or criminal liability might transnational 
corporations face in other national jurisdictions, and under what standards?  What 
exposure to criminal convictions for aiding and abetting might corporate executives face 
in criminal courts elsewhere, including the International Criminal Court (“ICC”)? 
¶6 The question of the proper scope of liability of corporations and their executives for 
aiding and abetting human rights violations is far from academic.  Consider the following 
list of transnational corporations recently sued under the ATS for allegedly aiding and 
abetting human rights violations:4 
 Caterpillar, for selling bulldozers to the Israeli military, which used 
them to demolish Palestinian homes,5 
 Chiquita, for allegedly paying Colombian paramilitary groups to 
keep the company’s banana plantations “free of labor opposition 
and social unrest,”6 
 Banque Nationale Paris Paribas, for alleged payments to Saddam 
Hussein’s regime in violation of the rules of the United Nations 
oil-for-food program,7 
 A Boeing subsidiary (Jeppesen Dataplan), for allegedly servicing 
flights used by the CIA for “extraordinary renditions” of suspected 
terrorists to other countries where interrogators commonly use 
torture and other unlawful techniques,8 
 Yahoo, for providing the Chinese government with internet records 
leading to the identification and alleged torture of a human rights 
activist,9 
 Drummond mining company, for allegedly paying Colombian 
paramilitaries who murdered labor activists,10 
 Wal-Mart, for failing to stop suppliers from committing labor 
abuses,11 
 Nestle, for buying cocoa and providing services to cocoa farmers 
employing child labor,12 
                                                 
4 The list is generally taken from the January 2008 petition for certiorari by corporate defendants in the 
South Africa apartheid litigation.  Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 23, n. 3, American Isuzu Motors Inc. 
v. Lungisile Ntsebeza, 2008 U.S. LEXIS 3868 (May 12, 2008) (affirming judgment below for lack of 
quorum). 
5 See Corrie v. Caterpillar, Inc., 403 F. Supp. 2d 1019 (W.D. Wash. 2005), aff’d on other grounds, 503 F.3d 
974 (2007), and petition for reh’g filed, No. 05-36210 (9th Cir. Oct. 9, 2007). 
6 Complaint ¶ 2, at 459-99, Does v. Chiquita Brands Int’l, Inc., No. 07-CV-10300 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 
2007). 
7 Complaint at 8-10, Mastafa v. Australian Wheat Bd., Ltd., No. 07-CIV-7955 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 11, 2007). 
8 First Amended Complaint at 67-69, Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., No. 5:07-CV-02798 (N.D. Cal. 
Aug. 1, 2007).  See generally also David Weissbrodt & Amy Bergquist, Extraordinary Rendition: A 
Human Rights Analysis, 19 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 123 (2006) (discussing extraordinary rendition). 
9 Second Amended Complaint at 2, Xiaoning v. Yahoo! Inc., No. 07-CV-2151 (N.D. Cal. July 30, 2007) 
(case settled). 
10 Complaint ¶ 49, Doe v. Drummond Co., No. 06-CV-61527 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 10, 2006) (case dismissed). 
11 First Amend. Complaint ¶ 47, 172-177, Doe v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 05-CV-7307 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 
28, 2005) (case dismissed; appeal pending). 
12 Complaint ¶¶ 35-37, Doe v. Nestle S.A., No. 05-CV-5133 (C.D.Cal. July 14, 2005). 
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 Unocal, for participating in a Burmese gas pipeline construction 
project, whose contracted security forces allegedly engaged in 
forced labor, forced displacement, murder and rape,13 and 
 Barclay’s Bank and dozens of other major corporations, for doing 
business with the apartheid regime in South Africa.14 
¶7 This article maps and discusses the main uncertainties in both international and 
U.S. ATS law concerning corporate aiding and abetting of foreign human rights 
violations.  Part II looks at questions under international criminal law.  Part III turns to 
issues under the ATS.  The article concludes with a call for clarification of both. 
II. AIDING AND ABETTING UNDER INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 
¶8 To what extent can corporations and corporate executives be prosecuted under 
international criminal law for aiding and abetting violations of human rights?  Corporate 
executives have long been held criminally liable for committing violations of human 
rights norms that do not require state action (Part A).  International criminal liability for 
aiding and abetting is also well-established (Part B).  However, debate continues over 
whether aiding and abetting under international criminal law requires that those who aid 
and abet merely have knowledge of the crime, or must instead harbor a purpose to 
facilitate the crime (Part C); such a purpose is required to prove aiding and abetting in 
most, but not all, cases before the International Criminal Court (Part D).  Finally, while 
corporations cannot generally be prosecuted before international criminal tribunals, 
recent trends in international criminal law require states to prosecute corporate violators 
of international norms where domestic legal systems permit prosecution of corporations, 
and where criminal prosecution is not possible, to impose proportional civil or 
administrative liability on corporations (Part E). 
A. Corporate Executives 
¶9 As human beings, corporate executives are no less subject to international criminal 
law than are other individuals.  This message was laid down plainly at the principal 
Nuremberg trial, where German industrialist Gustav Krupp was originally indicted along 
with top Nazi government, party and military leaders, and escaped prosecution only by 
reason of age and infirmity.15  In subsequent trials before British, French and American 
military courts, assorted German industrialists were convicted of such war crimes as 
plundering private property and using slave labor.16 
¶10 Most of these convictions were for crimes committed by the industrialists as 
principals.  But as the Zyklon B case discussed below illustrates, some convictions were 
                                                 
13 Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002), reh’g en banc granted, 395 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2003), 
and vacated and appeal dismissed following settlement, 403 F. 3d 708 (9th Cir. 2005). 
14 Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254 (2d Cir. 2007),  aff’d for lack of quorum sub nom 
American Isuzu Motors Inc. v. Lungisile Ntsebeza, 2008 U.S. LEXIS 3868 (May 12, 2008).. 
15 The Nurnberg Trial, 6 F.R.D. 69, 76 (1946). 
16 For overviews see generally Matthew Lippmann, War Crimes Trials of German Industrialists: The 
“Other Schindlers,” 9 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 173 (1995); Kyle Jacobson, Doing Business with the 
Devil: The Challenges of Prosecuting Corporate Officials Whose Business Transactions Facilitate War 
Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity, 56 A. F. L. REV. 167, 167-99 (2005). 
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for their actions as accomplices.  In other words, international criminal responsibility of 
corporate executives as accomplices has long been recognized. 
B. Accomplice Liability Under International Criminal Law 
¶11 Since Nuremberg there has been no question that accomplices, including those who 
aid and abet crimes, are responsible under international criminal law.  The Nuremberg 
Charter imposed individual responsibility on “accomplices participating in the 
formulation or execution of a common plan or conspiracy to commit” a crime 
enumerated within the Charter.17  Although the Nuremberg Tribunal limited application 
of this provision to crimes against peace and did not apply it to other crimes,18 the 
International Law Commission (“ILC”) of the United Nations in 1950 articulated 
Nuremberg Principle VII as follows: “Complicity in the commission of a crime against 
peace, a war crime, or a crime against humanity . . . is a crime under international law.”19 
¶12 In the early 1990s, the UN Security Council established the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”)20 and the International Criminal Tribunal 
for Rwanda (“ICTR”).21  Because the tribunals were established not by treaty, but by 
Council resolution, the UN Secretary-General reported that the provisions of the ICTY 
statute on individual criminal responsibility were intended to “codify existing norms of 
customary international law.”22  Both the ICTY and ICTR statutes impose individual 
criminal responsibility on any person who “aided and abetted in the planning, preparation 
or execution” of genocide, war crimes or crimes against humanity.23 
¶13 Similarly, but with greater precision, the ILC’s 1996 Draft Code of Crimes Against 
the Peace and Security of Mankind would impose criminal responsibility for genocide, 
crimes against humanity and war crimes (as well as other crimes) on an individual who 
“knowingly aids, abets or otherwise assists, directly and substantially, in the commission 
of such a crime, including providing the means for its commission.”24  The ICTY deemed 
the ILC Draft Code an “authoritative international instrument.”25 
                                                 
17 Nuremberg Charter, Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the 
European Axis, and Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Charter II, art. 6, entered into force Aug. 
8, 1945, 82 U.N.T.S. 280. 
18 See Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Trial Chamber, Judgment, ¶ 193 n. 217 (Dec. 10, 
1998), reprinted in 38 I.L.M. 317, ¶ 193 n. 217 (1999). 
19 Principles of International Law Recognized in the Charter of the Nurnberg Tribunal and in the Judgment 
of the Tribunal, [1950] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n, 377, U.N. Doc. A/CN. 4/SER.A/1950/Add. 1. 
20 Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of 
International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991, U.N. 
Doc. S/25704 at 36, annex (1993) and S/25704/Add.1 (1993), adopted by Security Council on May 25, 
1993, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993) [hereinafter ICTY Statute]. 
21 Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, as adopted by U.N. Security Council Res. 
955, Annex (1994), U.N. Doc. S/RES/955, Nov. 8, 1994 [hereinafter ICTR Statute].   
22 The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council 
Resolution 808, ¶ 29, U.N. Doc. S/25704 (May 3, 1993). 
23 ICTY Statute, supra note 20, art. 7.1; ICTR Statute, supra note 21, art. 6.1. 
24 Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, [1996] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n., ch. 2, 
arts. 2(3)(d), 17, 18, 20, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1996/Add.l (Part. 2), 
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/draft%20articles/7_4_1996.pdf. 
25 Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Trial Chamber, Judgment, ¶ 227 (Dec. 10, 1998), 
reprinted in 38 I.L.M. 317, ¶ 227 (1999). 
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¶14 Finally, in 1998 the Rome Statute for the International Criminal Court imposed 
criminal responsibility on one who “aids, abets or otherwise assists” in the commission of 
genocide, war crimes or crimes against humanity.26 
¶15 In sum, it cannot be seriously questioned that international criminal law in the 
human rights field imposes individual criminal responsibility on those who aid and abet. 
C. International Case Law on the Mens Rea Element of Aiding and Abetting: A 
Knowledge Test or A Purpose Test? 
¶16 Aiding and abetting has two elements: the conduct of the person who aids and abets 
(actus reus) and the person’s mental state (mens rea).27  There is little controversy in 
international criminal law that the actus reus, as summarized by the widely cited ICTY 
Trial Chamber Judgment in Furundzija, consists of rendering “practical assistance, 
encouragement, or moral support which has a substantial effect on the perpetration of the 
crime.”28 
¶17 The more contested issue is whether the aider and abettor need merely have 
knowledge that her actions will facilitate the commission of the crime, or whether she 
must harbor a purpose to facilitate the crime. 
¶18 Several immediate post-World War II cases used a knowledge standard. For 
example, in the Zyklon B case mentioned above, the prosecutors before the British 
military court  
did not attempt to prove that the accused acted with the intention of 
assisting the killing of the internees.  It was accepted that their purpose 
was to sell insecticide to the SS (for profit, that is a lawful goal pursued by 
lawful means).  The charge as accepted by the court was that they knew 
what the buyer in fact intended to do with the product they were 
supplying.29 
¶19 In the Einsatzgruppen case, the American military court also used a knowledge 
test, not a purpose test, to convict defendant Fendler: 
The defendant knew that executions were taking place.  He admitted that 
the procedure which determined the so-called guilt of a person which 
resulted in him being condemned to death was “too summary.”  But, there 
                                                 
26 ICC Statute, art. 25.3(c), infra note 35, (quoted in full infra note 36). 
27 Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, ¶ 191, 236. 
28 Id. ¶ 235.  The “moral support” element, however, has been controversial before U.S. judges, who have 
rejected it.  Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 949, n. 24 (majority opinion), 963 (Reinhardt, J., 
concurring opinion) (9th Cir. 2002) (subsequent history truncated); Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank Ltd., 
504 F.3d 254, 277 (2d Cir. 2007) (subsequent history truncated) (Katzmann, J., concurring).  In the context 
in which the concept is used in international cases, however, it is defensible.  For example, Furundzija cites 
the Synagogue Case, where the German Supreme Court convicted a long-time Nazi militant for aiding and 
abetting in the destruction of a synagogue.  Although the senior Nazi did not physically take part, he was 
present intermittently at the crime scene, and of course he knew what was going on.  Furundzija, Case No. 
IT-95-17/1-T, ¶ 205-207  (“It may be inferred from this case that an approving spectator who is held in 
such respect by the other perpetrators that his presence encourages them in their conduct, may be guilty of 
complicity in a crime against humanity.”). 
29 Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, ¶ 238; see also Lippman, supra note 16, at 181-82. 
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is no evidence that he ever did anything about it.  As the second highest 
ranking officer in the Kommando, his views could have been heard in 
complaint or protest against what he now says was a too summary 
procedure, but he chose to let the injustice go uncorrected.30 
¶20 Reviewing these and other post-World War II cases, as well as the “knowingly 
aids, abets or otherwise assists” standard of the ILC Draft Code (quoted above), the ICTY 
Trial Chamber in Furundzija adopted a knowledge test: “The mens rea required is the 
knowledge that these acts assist in the commission of the offence.”31 
¶21 In doing so, the ICTY acknowledged that the cases were not uniform.  It cited, but 
rejected, a purpose test used by an appeals court to set aside a conviction by a German 
court, sitting in the French occupied zone, of three low-level female government 
employees who had been ordered to search Jewish women for jewelry and valuables 
before they were deported from Vichy France to Germany.32  In finding the women not 
guilty, the appeals court ruled that the “aider and abettor has to have acted out of the 
same cast of mind as the principal, i.e., out of an inhuman cast of mind, or, in the case of 
persecutions, motivated by a political, racist or religious ideology.”33 
¶22 In another case known as the Ministries Case, an American military court at 
Nuremberg rejected a knowledge test.  In that case an executive of the Dresdner Bank 
was charged with providing loans to businesses, knowing that the money would be used 
to finance businesses utilizing slave labor.  Declining to convict the bank officer, the 
court explained: 
The real question is, is it a crime to make a loan, knowing or having good 
reason to believe that the borrower will us[e] the funds in financing 
enterprises which are employed in using labor in violation of either 
national or international law? . . .  Loans or sales of commodities to be 
used in an unlawful enterprise may well be condemned from a moral 
standpoint and reflect no credit on the part of the lender or seller . . . but 
the transaction can hardly be said to be a crime . . . .34 
¶23 If Furundzija is correct that the majority of case law applies a knowledge test, then, 
one must also acknowledge that the case law is not uniform.  At least some postwar cases 
require that the aider and abettor also have a criminal purpose. 
                                                 
30 Trial of Otto Ohlendorf and Others (Einsatzgruppen), 4 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE 
NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10, 572 (William S. Hein & Co., 
Inc. 1997) (1949) quoted in Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, ¶ 218. 
31 Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, ¶ 249. 
32 Id. ¶ 224, n. 247, ¶ 225, ¶ 240, n. 262, (quoting LG Hechingen, 28.6.1947, Kls 23/47 and OLG Tubingen, 
20.1.1948, Ss 54/47 (decision on appeal), reported in Justiz und NS-Verbrechen, case 022, Vol. I, 469 ff, 
498). 
33 Id. ¶ 225. 
34 United States v. von Weizsaecker (The Ministries Case), 14 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE 
NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10, 308, 622 (William S. Hein & 
Co., Inc. 1997) (1949), quoted in Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 292-93 (2d Cir. 2007), 
(subsequent history truncated) (Korman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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D. The International Criminal Court: A Purpose Test 
¶24 A few months before the ICTY Trial Chamber in Furundzija adopted a knowledge 
test for aiding and abetting, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (“ICC”) 
adopted a purpose test for most, but not all, cases of aiding and abetting.35  Article 25 (3) 
(c) of the ICC Statute makes criminally responsible one who, “[f]or the purpose of 
facilitating the commission of such a crime, aids, abets, or otherwise assists in its 
commission or its attempted commission, including providing the means for its 
commission . . . .” (emphasis added).36 
¶25 In retrospect, this standard seems surprising.  Only two years earlier, as noted 
above, the respected International Law Commission adopted a “knowingly” aids or abets 
standard in its Draft Code.  How did the ICC end up with a purpose test? 
¶26 The drafting history shows that the purpose test was not adopted until the Rome 
Conference.  Several prior drafts of the ICC Statute, including the final draft submitted to 
the Rome negotiators by the Preparatory Committee in 1998, bracketed the language of 
what ultimately became article 25 (3)(c). The bracketed language, indicating 
disagreement among the drafters, would have imposed responsibility on one who “[with 
[intent][knowledge] to facilitate the commission of such a crime,] aids, abets or otherwise 
assists in the commission . . . .”37 
¶27 There was thus a longstanding disagreement between advocates of a “knowledge” 
test and those who preferred an “intent” test.  The dispute was not resolved until the final 
negotiating conference at Rome.  In the end, neither term was chosen, and instead out 
popped the “purpose” test. 
¶28 Why?  I have not found any official explanation.  DePaul Law Professor M. Cherif 
Bassiouni, who chaired the drafting committee at the conference, explains that the 
decision was taken not by his committee, but by the Working Group on the General 
Principles of Criminal Law,38 chaired by Per Saland, Director of the Department for 
International Law and Human Rights of the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs.39  In a 
                                                 
35 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, United Nations Diplomatic Conference on 
Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, adopted July 17, 1998, entered 
into force, July 1, 2002, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9, 21, art. 25.3(c), 37 I.L.M. 999 (1998) [hereinafter ICC 
Statute].  Curiously, the Furundzija Court, although citing art. 25 of the then new ICC Statute in regard to 
actus reus, did not discuss it in regard to mens rea, in regard to which it cited only article 30 of the ICC 
Statute, dealing with knowledge and intent.  Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, ¶ 231, 243-45. 
36  ICC Statute, supra note 35, art. 25.3(c) provides: “In accordance with this Statute, a person shall be 
criminally responsible and liable for punishment for a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court if that 
person:  
(c)     For the purpose of facilitating the commission of such a crime, aids, abets or otherwise 
assists in its commission or its attempted commission, including providing the means for its 
commission; . . . ” 
37 M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: AN 
ARTICLE-BY-ARTICLE EVOLUTION OF THE STATUTE 194 (2005), (1998 Preparatory Committee Draft art. 
23.7(d)); see id. at 197 (Zutphen Draft art. 17.7(d)); see id. at 198 (Decisions Taken By Prepatory 
Committee In Its Session Held 11 to 21 February 1997, article B(d)); see also id. at 203 (1996 Preparatory 
Committee, Proposal 3.2 “An accomplice is a person who knowingly, through aid or assistance, facilitates 
the preparation or commission of a crime.”) 
38 Telephone interview with Cherif Bassiouni, Professor, DePaul University College of Law, in Chicago, IL 
(Feb. 22, 2008). 
39 See THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: THE MAKING OF THE ROME STATUTE xviii (Roy S. Lee ed., 
1999) [hereinafter Lee]. 
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compilation of reports on the drafting process edited by the Executive Secretary of the 
Diplomatic Conference, Mr. Saland discusses article 25, but not article 25 (3) (c), or how 
the bracketed dispute between “knowledge” and “intent” got resolved as “purpose.”40 
¶29 Professor Bassiouni believes the dispute had to do with differences between civil 
law and common law lawyers and different understandings of language.41  If so, the 
language in the end seems to have come out the same in both English and French: a 
“purpose” test.42 
¶30 Professor Dr. Kai Ambos, a leading scholar who was a member of the German 
delegation at the Rome Conference and in a position to know, explains that the “purpose” 
test was borrowed from the Model Penal Code of the American Law Institute.43  
Originally adopted in 1962, the Model Code specifies a purpose test for aiding and 
abetting, as follows: 
 
Section 2.06.  Liability for Conduct of Another; Complicity. 
. . .  
(3) A person is an accomplice of another person in the commission of an 
offense if: 
(a) with the purpose of promoting or facilitating the commission of the 
offense, he 
. . . 
(ii) aids or agrees or attempts to aid such other person in planning or 
committing it . . . .44 
 
¶31 Professor Ambos’ explanation is supported by the similarity of language between 
Model Penal Code 2.06(3) (a) (“purpose of promoting or facilitating the commission of 
the offense”), and ICC Statute Article 25 (3) (c) (“purpose of facilitating the commission 
of such a crime”).45 
¶32 The question, then, is what a purpose test means.46  In the Model Penal Code, a 
person acts “purposely” if he or she has a “conscious object” to cause a given result.47  To 
                                                 
40 Id. at 198-200. 
41 Telephone conversation with Cherif Bassiouni, Professor, DePaul University College of Law, Chicago, 
IL (Feb. 22, 2008). 
42 The equally authoritative French text of the first clause of  article 25(3)(c) reads, “En vue de faciliter la 
commission d’un tel crime . . . .”  Statut de Rome de la Cour pénale internationale, art. 25(3)(c) (July, 7 
1998), available at http://www.icrc.org/DIH.nsf/WebART/585-50025?OpenDocument.  This might 
literally be translated, “With a view toward facilitating the commission of such a crime . . . .”  A more 
accurate translation is probably, “With the aim of facilitating the commission of such a crime .…”   
43 Kai Ambos, General Principles of Criminal Law in the Rome Statute, 10 CRIM. L.F. 1, 10 (1999).  
Professor Dr. Ambos is the Chair of Criminal Law, Criminal Procedure, Comparative Law and 
International Criminal Law at the Georg-August-Universität Göttingen in Germany. 
44 MODEL PENAL CODE: OFFICIAL DRAFT AND EXPLANATORY NOTES 29-30, § 2.06 (1985) (as adopted at 
the 1962 Annual Meeting of the American Law Institute) [hereinafter MODEL PENAL CODE]. 
45 See full text of ICC Statute art. 25(3)(c), supra note 36. 
46 ICC Statute supra note 35, at 24, arts. 30.2, 30.3.  The ICC Statute defines “knowledge” and “intent,” but 
not “purpose.”  The word “purpose” is not used elsewhere in the substantive criminal articles of the Statute, 
except in article 25.3(d). See full text infra note 54. 
47 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(a) (“A person acts purposely with respect to a material element of an 
offense when: (i) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or a result thereof, it is his conscious 
object to engage in conduct of that nature or to cause such a result; and (ii) if the element involves the 
attendant circumstances, he is aware of the existence of such circumstances or he believes or hopes that 
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aid and abet under the Code, one must have a conscious object to cause the commission 
of the principal crime.  
¶33 However, this Code definition is not necessarily imported into the ICC Statute.  
The ICC Statute is a treaty.  In international law the general rule is that a “treaty shall be 
interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms 
of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.”48  The 
“preparatory work” of a treaty is only a “supplementary” means of interpretation, 
consulted only to “confirm” the meaning that results from the general rule, or if the 
general rule produces an unclear or absurd meaning.49 
¶34 In this case the drafting history simply confirms the meaning resulting from the 
general rule, because the “ordinary meaning” of “purpose” is that the person consciously 
intends to bring about the result in question.50 
¶35 Even so, “purpose” in the ICC Statute need not mean the exclusive or even primary 
purpose.  A secondary purpose, including one inferred from knowledge of the likely 
consequences, should suffice.  Consider, for example, the Zyklon B case.  The court 
accepted that the purpose of the defendant businessmen in selling Zyklon B, while 
knowing that it would be used in the gas chambers, was to make a profit. For all the court 
knew, the defendants could not care less about Hitler’s goal of eliminating the Jews; they 
simply aimed to profit from his doing so.  Yet by supplying gas in the knowledge that it 
would be used to kill human beings, one may infer that one of their purposes -- 
admittedly secondary -- was to encourage continued mass killings of Jews.  Only so 
could they continue selling large quantities of gas to the Nazis for profit: if Hitler were to 
cease gassing Jews, the Nazis would no longer buy so much gas.51 
                                                                                                                                                 
they exist.”). 
48 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 31.1, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.331 [hereinafter 
Vienna Convention]. 
49 Id. art. 32 (“Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory 
work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to confirm the meaning resulting from 
the application of article 31, or to determine the meaning when the interpretation according to article 31: (a) 
leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or (b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or 
unreasonable.”). 
50 The first definition of “purpose” in Merriam-Webster’s Online Dictionary, for example, is “something set 
up as an object or end to be attained.”  Merriam-Webster’s Online Dictionary Definition of Purpose, 
available at http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/purpose.  
51 Cf. Direct Sales Co. v. U.S., 319 U.S. 703, 713 (1943).  In upholding the conspiracy conviction of a drug 
company that supplied obviously excessive quantities of morphine to a physician who it must have known 
was selling them illegally, the Court inferred criminal intent from the company’s knowledge.  The Court 
explained: “When the evidence discloses such a system, working in prolonged cooperation with a 
physician's unlawful purpose to supply him with his stock in trade for his illicit enterprise, there is no legal 
obstacle to finding that the supplier not only knows and acquiesces, but joins both mind and hand with him 
to make its accomplishment possible. The step from knowledge to intent and agreement may be taken. 
There is more than suspicion, more than knowledge, acquiescence, carelessness, indifference, lack of 
concern. There is informed and interested cooperation, stimulation, instigation. And there is also a ‘stake in 
the venture’ which, even if it may not be essential, is not irrelevant to the question of conspiracy. 
Petitioner's stake here was in making the profits which it knew could come only from its encouragement of 
Tate's illicit operations. In such a posture the case does not fall doubtfully outside either the shadowy 
border between lawful cooperation and criminal association or the no less elusive line which separates 
conspiracy from overlapping forms of criminal cooperation.” (Footnote omitted.) 
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¶36 This seems to be the only reasonable interpretation of “purpose,” if article 25 (3) 
(c) is interpreted, as it must be, in light of the “object and purpose” of the ICC Statute.52  
The purpose of the Statute is to ensure that “the most serious crimes of concern to the 
international community as a whole must not go unpunished.”53  It is difficult to believe 
that the drafters would have intended that those who knowingly supply gas to the gas 
chambers, for the primary purpose of profit, should escape punishment. 
¶37 A separate provision of article 25 -- article 25 (3) (d) -- provides an alternative 
theory of responsibility where a “group of persons” acts “with a common purpose.”54 
Anyone who intentionally facilitates a crime by such a group can be held responsible, if 
he or she has either the “aim” to further the group’s criminal activity or purpose, or the 
“knowledge” of the group’s intention to commit the crime.55  The ICC Statute thus 
embraces a “knowledge” test as sufficient to impose criminal responsibility on one who 
aids and abets a group crime.56  
¶38 Per Saland, the Swedish diplomat who chaired the Working Group at Rome, 
explains that this provision emerged from a debate over whether to include criminal 
responsibility for conspiracy between common law lawyers, who favored it, and some 
civil law lawyers whose systems do not criminalize conspiracy.  The solution was found 
at Rome by borrowing, “with slight modifications,” language from the International 
Convention on the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, and inserting it into what is now 
article 25 (3) (d) of the ICC Statute. 57 
                                                 
52 Vienna Convention, supra note 48, art. 31.1.  
53 ICC Statute, supra note 35, at 4, pmbl. 
54 ICC Statute, supra note 35, at 22, art. 25.3(d) provides: “In accordance with this Statute, a person shall 
be criminally responsible and liable for punishment for a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court if that 
person . . . .” 
     (d)     In any other way contributes to the commission or attempted commission of such a crime by a 
group of persons acting with a common purpose. Such contribution shall be intentional and shall either:  
          (i)     Be made with the aim of furthering the criminal activity or criminal purpose of the group,  
where such activity or purpose involves the commission of a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court; or  
          (ii)     Be made in the knowledge of the intention of the group to commit the crime . . . .” 
55 ICC Statute, supra note 35, art. 25 (3)(d)(i), (ii). 
56 Professor Ambos does not agree that article 25 (3) (d) allows mere knowledge to suffice to aid and abet a 
group crime.  Because he reads article 25 (3) (d) to require the “aim” of promoting the crime, he views it as 
duplicative of article 25 (3) (c), and hence “simply superfluous.”  Ambos, supra note 43, at 12-13.  With 
respect, Professor Ambos’ reading is not supported by the text of article 25(3)(d), which makes 
“knowledge” an alternate theory of liability for aiding and abetting a group crime.  ICC Statute, supra note 
35, art. 25(3)(d).  Nor is his reading supported by the general presumption that drafters do not insert 
superfluous articles. 
 As put succinctly by another scholar, the better reading is that “under the ICC Statute, while intent is 
required to aid and abet a crime committed by a single person (or a plurality of persons not forming a joint 
criminal enterprise) [under article 25(3)(c)], knowledge is sufficient to aid and abet a joint criminal 
enterprise [under article 25(3)(d)].”  A. Reggio, Aiding and Abetting in International Criminal Law: The 
Responsibility of Corporate Agents and Businessmen For “Trading With The Enemy” of Mankind, 5 INT’L 
CRIM.L.REV. 623, 647 (2005).  Reggio suggests that a “possible reason” for the lower mens rea required to 
aid and abet group crimes is that they are considered “more serious than crimes committed by a single 
person.” Id. at 647, n. 102. 
57 Lee, supra note 39, at 199-200; see International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, 
art. 2(3)(c), Jan. 8, 1998, G.A. Res. 164, U.N. GAOR, 52nd Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 389, U.N. Doc. A/52/49 
(1998) (making criminally responsible anyone who, “(c) In any other way contributes to the commission of 
one or more offences as set forth in paragraph 1 or 2 of the present article by a group of persons acting with 
a common purpose; such contribution shall be intentional and either be made with the aim of furthering the 
general criminal activity or purpose of the group or be made in the knowledge of the intention of the group 
to commit the offence or offences concerned.”). 
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¶39 In the context of the terrorist bombings convention, the purpose of this theory of 
criminal responsibility is understandable: anyone who contributes to the commission of a 
terrorist bombing by, say, supplying explosives or funds, and who has knowledge of a 
terrorist group’s intent to commit a bombing, should be held criminally responsible. 
¶40 Parallels could arise in the corporate context.  For example, where a corporate 
executive contributes funds or explosives to a Colombian paramilitary group, knowing of 
its intent to murder labor leaders or bomb a union office, the executive should be held 
criminally responsible for aiding and abetting the crimes.  His knowledge is sufficient; 
there is no need to prove that he shared the purpose to kill the labor leaders (although that 
too may be inferred from the circumstances).  In some cases governmental bodies may 
also be sufficiently cohesive and criminal to qualify as “groups,” so that corporate 
executives who knowingly assist them can be held criminally responsible for aiding and 
abetting.58 
¶41 In conclusion, despite the “purpose” test in ICC Statute article 25 (3) (c), one can 
make a responsible argument that customary international law, as reflected in the 
majority of the post-World War II case law, the case law of the ICTY59 and ICTR,60 the 
ILC Draft Code, and group crimes under article 25 (3) (d) of the ICC Statute, requires 
that those who aid and abet merely have knowledge that they are assisting criminal 
activity.  
                                                 
58 Articles 9 and 10 of the Nuremberg Charter allowed the International Military Tribunal to declare a 
“group or organization” criminal. The Nurnberg Trial 1946, 6 F.R.D. 69, 131 (1946).  The Tribunal’s 
Judgment defined groups based on whether they had a common criminal purpose or activity, whether they 
committed crimes as a group rather than merely as a collection of individuals, and whether the group’s 
members participated knowingly and voluntarily at a responsible level.  The Tribunal viewed "group" as a 
“wider and more embracing term than ‘organization.’" Id. at 146.  In either case, the Tribunal explained, “A 
criminal organization is analogous to a criminal conspiracy in that the essence of both is cooperation for 
criminal purposes. There must be a group bound together and organized for a common purpose.  The group 
must be formed or used in connection with the commission of crimes denounced by the Charter.” Id. at 
132. 
 The Tribunal found some but not all of the accused government agencies to be criminal groups in this 
sense.  Finding that the Gestapo and SD were used for criminal purposes after 1939, the Tribunal declared 
to be criminal “the group composed of those members” who held positions above a certain level after 1939 
and who became or remained members with knowledge that the group was being used to commit crimes 
under the Charter, or who were “personally implicated as members of the organization in the commission 
of such crimes.”  Id. at 139-40. 
 On the other hand, neither Hitler’s Cabinet nor the military high command were deemed to be groups.  
After 1937 the Cabinet never “really acted as a group or organization.”  It never met and was “merely an 
aggregation of administrative officers subject to the absolute control of Hitler.”  Although “[a] number of 
the cabinet members were undoubtedly involved in the conspiracy to make aggressive war . . . they were 
involved as individuals, and there is no evidence that the cabinet as a group or organization took any part in 
these crimes.”  Id. at 144-45. 
 In the case of the military high command, the Tribunal noted that “their planning at staff level, the 
constant conferences between staff officers and field commanders, their operational technique in the field 
and at headquarters was much the same as that of the . . . forces of all other countries.”  It continued, “To 
derive from this pattern of their activities the existence of an association or group does not . . . logically 
follow.  On such a theory the top commanders of every other nation are just such an association rather than 
what they actually are, an aggregation of military men, a number of individuals who happen at a given 
period of time to hold the high-ranking military positions.” Id. at 146. 
59 Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Trial Chamber, Judgment, ¶ 193 n. 217 (Dec. 10, 
1998), reprinted in 38 I.L.M. 317, ¶ 193 n. 217 (1999); see also Prosecutor v. Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33-A, 
Appeals Judgment, ¶¶ 134, 143 (Apr. 19, 2004); see also Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Trial 
Chamber Judgment, ¶ 674 (May 7, 1977). 
60 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, ¶ 545 (Sept. 2, 1998).  
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¶42 Moreover, even if a stricter interpretation of customary law might be required for 
ATS law in the U.S. (as discussed below), leading to the adoption of the more stringent 
standard of ICC Statute article 25 (3) (c) -- that the aider and abettor must do so for the 
“purpose” of facilitating a crime -- such purpose need not be exclusive or primary.  One 
who knowingly sells gas to the gas chamber operator for the primary purpose of profit 
may be inferred to have a secondary purpose of killing people, so that he can keep selling 
more gas to kill more people.  Such a merchant of death aids and abets the principal 
murderers.  Neither the ICC Statute nor any other source of international law should be 
interpreted otherwise. 
E. International Criminal Law Responsibility of Corporations 
¶43 Corporations cannot generally be prosecuted before international criminal courts, 
and current international law does not generally impose criminal responsibility on 
corporations.  The Nuremberg Charter did permit the International Military Tribunal to 
declare “groups or organizations” criminal.  However, the Tribunal could do so only at 
the trial of an “individual.”61  Moreover, the only consequence of declaring an 
organization criminal was not to punish the organization, but rather to permit individual 
members to be put on trial for belonging to the organization, without the need in each 
case to retry its “criminal nature.”62  The Nuremberg Tribunal thus declared as criminal 
the groups consisting of the knowing and voluntary members (in some cases only those 
above a certain rank) of the Nazi Party Leadership Corps, SD, SS and Gestapo.63 
¶44 Otherwise only natural persons were tried at Nuremberg.  Likewise the ICTY, 
ICTR and ICC Statutes all provide jurisdiction only over natural persons.64  The reason is 
in part philosophical objections by some states to prosecutions of legal entities,65 and in 
part the fact that only some national justice systems (such as the United States) allow 
corporations per se to be convicted of crimes. 
¶45 Per Saland describes the unsuccessful effort at the Rome Conference to subject 
“legal entities” to ICC jurisdiction.  He explains that a very difficult issue throughout the 
Conference was 
whether to include criminal responsibility of legal entities . . . .  This 
matter deeply divided the delegations.  For representatives of countries 
whose legal system does not provide for the criminal responsibility of 
legal entities, it was hard to accept its inclusion, which would have had 
far-reaching legal consequences for the question of complementarity.  
Others strongly favored the inclusion on grounds of efficiency . . . . 
                                                 
61 Nuremberg Charter, supra note 17, art. 9. 
62 Id. art. 10. 
63 The Nurnberg Trial 1946, 6 F.R.D. at 131-46. 
64 ICTY Statute, supra note 20, art. 6; ICTR Statute, supra note 21, art. 5; ICC Statute, supra note 35, art. 
25(1). 
65 The argument is that individuals, but not abstract legal entities, can bear moral responsibility and hence 
deserve criminal conviction.  See M.C. BASSIOUNI, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL LAW 378 (Kluwer Law Int. 2d ed. 1999). 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  J O U R N AL  O F  I N T E R N A T I O N A L  H U M A N  R I G H T S  [ 2 0 0 8  
 
 316
Among the last opponents were Nordic countries, Switzerland, the 
Russian Federation and Japan.  Some other countries opposed inclusion on 
procedural . . . grounds.  Time was running out . . . .  Eventually, it was 
recognized that the issue could not be settled by consensus in Rome . . . .66 
¶46 One can understand that countries whose domestic laws do not permit criminal 
prosecution of corporations would oppose prosecutions of corporations before the ICC. 
ICC jurisdiction is based on the concept of “complementarity”: the ICC can take 
jurisdiction only when national justice systems are unwilling or unable to do so.67  
Because countries whose domestic systems do not allow criminal prosecutions of 
corporations are “unable” to prosecute corporations, the ICC would automatically have 
jurisdiction.  To allow prosecutions of corporations before the ICC would thus bypass the 
essential balance struck between national sovereignty and international jurisdiction. 
¶47 This might suggest that the opposition was not so much on principle as on grounds 
of practicality: there was no time during the five-week Rome conference to revise 
domestic legislation.  It was probably a bit of both: longstanding legal traditions tend to 
generate their own philosophical supporters.  In any event, the jurisdiction of 
international courts over corporations is not established at present, nor likely in the near 
future. 
¶48 This does not mean, however, that substantive international criminal law ignores 
corporate responsibility.  In the last decade a widely accepted international law trend has 
emerged to impose criminal or civil liability on legal persons that aid and abet treaty 
violations, with a preference for criminal liability.  At least three recent conventions -- the 
1997 OECD convention on bribery of foreign public officials,68 the 1999 UN convention 
on financing of terrorism,69 and the 2000 UN convention on transnational organized 
crime70 -- require States Parties to impose criminal sanctions on legal persons or, where 
that is not possible under domestic law, non-criminal sanctions, in accordance with their 
domestic legal principles. 
¶49 The pattern was set by the OECD Convention, which makes clear a preference for 
criminal sanctions:  
                                                 
66 Lee, supra note 39, at 199 (footnote omitted). 
67 ICC Statute, supra note 35, art. 17. 
68 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Convention on Combating Bribery of 
Foreign Public Officials in International Business transactions, art. 2, Nov. 21, 1997, 
DAFFE/IME/BR(97)20, [hereinafter Bribery Convention] (entered into force, Feb. 15, 1999, art. 2 provides 
“Each party shall take such measures as may be necessary, in accordance with its legal principles, to 
establish the liability of legal persons .…”).  The Convention has 37 states parties, including the US, as of 
June 19, 2007.  See ratification table at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/59/13/1898632.pdf (last visited Feb. 
23, 2008). 
69 International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, art. 5, Dec. 9, 1999, G.A. 
Res. 109, U.N. GAOR, 54th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 408, U.N. Doc. A/54/49 (Vol. I) (1999) [hereinafter 
Financing Terrorism Convention] (entered into force April 10, 2002, art. 5(3) mandates “effective, 
proportional and dissuasive criminal, civil or administrative sanctions”). 
70 Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, art. 10, Nov. 15, 2000, G.A. res. 55/25, annex I, 55 
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 49) at 44, U.N. Doc. A/45/49 (Vol. I) (2001) [hereinafter Transnational Organized 
Crime Convention], (entered into force Sept. 29, 2003, Art. 10(4) specifies that States must impose 
“effective, proportional and dissuasive criminal or non-criminal sanctions, including monetary sanctions”). 
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In the event that under the legal system of a Party, criminal responsibility 
is not applicable to legal persons, that Party shall ensure that legal persons 
shall be subject to effective, proportional and dissuasive non-criminal 
sanctions.71 
Similar language appears in both UN Conventions,72 which also require sanctions for 
legal persons who aid and abet violators.73  These principles have now gained wide 
international acceptance: the two UN treaties have 132 and 160 states parties, 
respectively, including the United States.74  In addition, the Optional Protocol on the Sale 
of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography, with 126 States Parties, requires 
States to impose “liability,” which depending on their national law may be “criminal, 
civil or administrative,” on legal persons “complicit” in violations.75 
III. CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR AIDING AND ABETTING UNDER THE ATS 
¶50 The two-centuries-old ATS grants federal courts “jurisdiction of any civil action by 
an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the 
United States.”76  The extent to which corporate liability for aiding and abetting foreign 
violations of human rights is actionable under the ATS remains in dispute.  Part A below 
discusses the scant guidance given to date by the Supreme Court.  Part B describes the 
conflicting federal appeals court opinions.  Part C argues that corporations can indeed be 
subjected to liability for aiding and abetting under the ATS.  Part D offers brief 
observations (but not answers) on the questions of whether the ATS standard for aiding 
and abetting should be drawn from international criminal law or from federal common 
law, and whether it should be a “knowledge” test or a “purpose” test. 
A. Limited Supreme Court Precedent 
¶51 The Supreme Court has yet to give clear guidance on how to resolve ATS cases in 
which corporations are sued for aiding and abetting foreign human rights violations.  The 
Court has addressed the ATS only once, in 2004 in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain.77  The case 
                                                 
71 Bribery Convention, supra note 68, art. 3(2). 
72 Transnational Organized Crime Convention, supra note 70, art. 10(4); Financing Terrorism Convention, 
supra note 69, art. 5(3). 
73 Financing Terrorism Convention, supra note 69, arts. 5 (a) (accomplice liability), 5(c) (intentionally 
contributing to commission of crime by a group with a common purpose, as quoted at note 57 supra from 
the parallel language in the Terrorist Bombing Convention); Transnational Organized Crime Convention, 
supra note 70, art. 5(1)(b) (aiding or abetting). 
74 The Transnational Organized Crime Convention has 138 States Parties through November 15, 2007, 
while the Financing of Terrorism Convention has 160 States Parties through November 15, 2007.  
Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General, available at http://untreaty.un.org/ (last visited 
Apr. 21, 2008).  The US ratified the Terrorism Financing Convention on June 26, 2002, and the 
Transnational Organized Crime Convention on November 3, 2005. 
75 Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Sale of Children, Child 
Prostitution and Child Pornography, May 25, 2000, G.A. Res. 54/263, Annex II, 54 U.N. GAOR Supp. 
(No. 49) at 6, U.N. Doc. A/54/49, Vol. III (2000) (entered into force Jan. 18, 2002).  The Protocol has 126 
states parties as of Feb. 25, 2008.  See ratification table at 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/ratification/11_c.htm (last visited 6 March 2008). 
76 Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2007). 
77 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004).  The Court also briefly considered an issue of 
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involved the kidnapping of a Mexican citizen in Mexico by a group of locals hired by the 
U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency (“DEA”).  Sosa, whom the Court described simply as a 
Mexican “citizen,”78 and five other Mexican “civilians,”79 allegedly kidnapped Alvarez 
Machain in Mexico, held him overnight in a motel, and then flew him to Texas, where 
they turned him over to the DEA.80 
¶52 In the subsequent suit by Alvarez-Machain against Sosa under the ATS for 
arbitrary detention, all members of the Supreme Court agreed that Sosa was not liable 
under international law for a detention of “less than a day, followed by the transfer of 
custody to lawful authorities and a prompt arraignment.”81  All the justices likewise 
agreed, or at least did not dispute, that the ATS was originally intended to give federal 
courts jurisdiction to hear common law tort suits for the 18th-century law of nations 
paradigms of “violation of safe conducts, infringement of the rights of ambassadors, and 
piracy.”82 
¶53 Six justices went on to rule, however, that courts exercising ATS jurisdiction today 
may also, subject to “great caution,”83 create causes of action under federal common law 
for “any claim based on the present-day law of nations,” so long as the claim rests on “a 
norm of international character accepted by the civilized world and defined with a 
specificity comparable to the features of the 18th-century paradigms.”84 
¶54 The overnight detention of Alvarez-Machain did not meet this high bar.85  
However, other customary international law norms -- such as the prohibitions of 
genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, torture and forced labor -- would appear 
to have sufficiently widespread international acceptance and definitional specificity to 
meet the Court’s standard.86 
¶55 Where foreign governments or rebel or paramilitary groups violate such norms, and 
corporations are complicit, issues arise as to whether corporations can be held liable for 
aiding and abetting and, if so, under what body of law and by what standards. Sosa gives 
scant guidance in answering these questions.  The case involved neither aiding and 
abetting, nor the liability of a corporation or corporate officer.  Nor did the Court provide 
any guidance on these topics, except in two footnotes.   
¶56 In one, the Court made clear that it is not enough, in order to recognize a common 
law cause of action under the ATS, that an international norm possesses the requisite 
international acceptance and specificity.  In cases against private actors, such as 
corporations or individuals, courts must also consider whether the norm extends not 
merely to states, but also to the private actors.87  Justice Breyer, concurring, explained, 
                                                                                                                                                 
jurisdiction over ATS claims in Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 484-85 (2004). 
78 Id. at 698. 
79 Id.  Nothing in the Court’s opinion flagged any legal importance in terming Sosa a “citizen,” or his 
confederates “civilians.”   
80 Id. 
81 Id. at 697, 712, 738. 
82 Id. at 724-25, 729. 
83 Id. at 728. 
84 Id. at 724-25. 
85 Id. at 738. 
86 See id. at 732 (citing several earlier lower court opinions as “generally consistent” with the standard of 
general acceptance and specificity of the international norm). 
87 Footnote 20 stated: “A related consideration is whether international law extends the scope of liability for 
a violation of a given norm to the perpetrator being sued, if the defendant is a private actor such as a 
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“The norm must extend liability to the type of perpetrator (e.g., a private actor) the 
plaintiff seeks to sue.”88  This merely made explicit what should be obvious: corporations 
or their officers cannot be sued for violating norms that apply only to states, such as the 
international ban on individual acts of torture in peacetime.89  However, as discussed 
below, it shed little light on the separate question of whether a corporation can aid and 
abet a violation committed by state actors. 
¶57 The Court’s second relevant footnote advised that courts on a “case-specific basis” 
give “serious weight” to the views of the Executive as to the impact of the apartheid 
litigation and similar cases on foreign policy.90  As a practical matter, in cases like the 
apartheid litigation, where the State Department objects to ATS suits on foreign policy 
grounds, government objections pose a serious obstacle to suing corporations for aiding 
and abetting foreign human rights violations.91  But where the State Department does not 
object, or where a court overrides its objections, the Court’s dictum is of no help in 
deciding whether corporations or their officers can be held liable for aiding and abetting 
and, if so, under what source of law and by what standard. 
B. Conflicting Appellate Opinions 
¶58 The uncertainties besetting lower courts are reflected in a multiplicity of judicial 
views on how to resolve them.  The two leading appellate analyses of corporate liability 
for aiding and abetting are the Ninth Circuit panel decision in 2002 in Unocal,92 and the 
Second Circuit panel decision in 2007 in Khulumani (the South African apartheid 
litigation).93  In Unocal, Burmese residents were allegedly subjected to forced labor, 
forced displacement, murder and rape by Burmese military forces providing security for a 
natural gas pipeline being built by a project in which Unocal participated.  In an opinion 
rendered before the Supreme Court decided Sosa, a Ninth Circuit panel held unanimously 
that corporations can be sued for aiding and abetting foreign human rights violators, and 
                                                                                                                                                 
corporation or individual.  Compare Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic .… 726 F.2d 774, 791-795 (CADC 
1984) (Edwards, J., concurring) (insufficient consensus in 1984 that torture by private actors violates 
international law), with Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 239-241 (CA2 1995) (sufficient consensus in 1995 
that genocide by private actors violates international law).”  Id. at 732, n.20. 
88 Id. at 760. 
89 Torture does not require state action when committed in wartime, or when committed as part of a 
widespread or systematic attack on civilians.  In such situations torture by non-state actors qualifies as, 
respectively, a war crime or a crime against humanity.  ICC Statute, supra note 35, arts. 7(1)(f), 7(2)(e) 
(crimes against humanity), 8(2)(a)(ii), 8(2)(c)(i) (war crimes). 
90 Footnote 21 stated in part: “Another possible limitation that we need not apply here is a policy of case-
specific deference to the political branches.”  Sosa, 542 U.S. at 733 n.21.  Citing an early stage of the 
apartheid litigation and noting that the South African government and the State Department both opposed 
it, the Court added, “In such cases, there is a strong argument that federal courts should give serious weight 
to the Executive Branch’s view of the case’s impact on foreign policy.” Id. 
91 When the Second Circuit reached the issue in Khulumani, dissenting Judge Korman thought this 
language a sufficient signal from the Supreme Court to require dismissal of the case.  Khulumani v. Barclay 
Nat’l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 292, 298 (2d Cir. 2007), aff’d for lack of quorum sub nom American Isuzu 
Motors Inc. v. Lungisile Ntsebeza, 2008 U.S. LEXIS 3868 (May 12, 2008).  However, the majority did not, 
leaving the issue to be addressed by the district court on remand.  Id. at 261 n.9.  The majority went so far 
as to suggest that while the courts should indeed give serious weight to the views of the Executive, to treat 
them as dispositive would raise serious separation of powers issues.  Id. at 263 n.14. 
92 Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 932 (9th Cir. 2002) (subsequent history truncated). 
93 Khulumani, 504 F.3d 254, 254 (2d Cir. 2007), aff’d for lack of quorum sub nom American Isuzu Motors 
Inc. v. Lungisile Ntsebeza, 2008 U.S. LEXIS 3868 (May 12, 2008).   
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accordingly denied Unocal’s motion to dismiss.94  After Sosa was decided, Unocal settled 
with the plaintiffs, and the panel opinion was vacated as part of the settlement.95  
¶59 In Khulumani, victims of apartheid in South Africa sued dozens of transnational 
corporations for doing business with the apartheid regime.  In a ruling handed down after 
Sosa, a divided Second Circuit panel, also holding that corporations can be sued for 
aiding and abetting, denied the corporate defendants’ motion to dismiss.96  On a petition 
for writ of certiorari brought by defendant corporations, four members of the Supreme 
Court recused themselves, and the Court in May 2008 therefore affirmed the judgment 
below for lack of a quorum.97  
¶60 Although five of the six appellate court judges in these two cases thought 
corporations can be sued under ATS for aiding and abetting, the six judges managed to 
generate five divergent opinions on whether, and by what law and standard, corporations 
can be held liable for aiding and abetting.  They split as follows: 
 Two judges in the Unocal majority ruled that corporations can be 
held liable under an aiding and abetting standard, as defined by 
international law to require a showing that the corporation engaged 
in “knowing practical assistance” to the human rights violator.98 
 Judge Reinhardt, concurring in the result, ruled that Unocal’s 
liability was governed, “not by applying a recently-promulgated 
international criminal law aiding-and-abetting standard,”99 but 
instead by federal common law, which permits liability under three 
separate theories: joint venture, agency and reckless disregard.100 
 In Khulumani, Judge Katzmann, one of two judges concurring in 
the brief per curiam denial of the motion to dismiss, ruled that 
corporate liability for aiding and abetting is indeed governed by an 
international criminal law standard, but not the “knowing practical 
assistance” standard adopted in Unocal; rather, at least for now, it 
must be shown that the corporation not only knew that its 
assistance would further a human rights violation, but also that its 
purpose was to assist the violation.101 
 Also concurring in Khulumani, Judge Hall ruled that liability for 
aiding and abetting is governed, not by international law, but by 
federal common law; however, unlike Judge Reinhardt in Unocal, 
he embraced a common law aiding and abetting standard of 
knowing practical assistance, without addressing joint venture, 
agency or reckless disregard.102 
                                                 
94 See generally Unocal, 395 F.3d 932. 
95 Doe I. v. Unocal, 403 F. 3d 708 (9th Cir. 2005), vacating 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002), and dismissing 
appeal following settlement of 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002). 
96 Khulumani, 504 F.3d 254, 254. 
97American Isuzu Motors Inc., v. Lungisile Ntsebeza, 2008 U.S. LEXIS 3868 (May 12, 2008).    
98 Unocal, 395 F.3d at 951. 
99 Unocal, (Reinhardt, J., concurring), 395 F.3d at 963. 
100 Id. at 963. 
101 Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 264, 277 (Katzmann, J., concurring). 
102 Id. at 284, 287, 288-89, (Hall, J., concurring). 
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 Dissenting in relevant part in Khulumani, Judge Korman denied 
that corporations can be liable under the ATS at all.  Although 
agreeing with Judge Katzmann that the governing standard of 
aiding and abetting liability under the ATS is the international law 
standard of practical assistance for the purpose of facilitating the 
violation, Judge Korman opined that this standard applies only to 
individuals, not corporations, which can never be held liable for 
aiding and abetting under international law.103 
¶61 Some of this scatter might have narrowed if the Supreme Court had been able to 
muster a quorum and decided to accept the petition for review of the Khulumani 
judgment filed by the corporate defendants (under the name of American Isuzu Motors 
Inc. v. Ntsebeza).104  The corporations proposed three questions for review, two of which 
would not have required the Court to address issues relating to aiding and abetting.105  
However, the United States as amicus recommended that the Court take only the one 
question which did relate to aiding and abetting: “Whether a private defendant may be 
sued under the ATS for aiding and abetting a violation of international law by a foreign 
government in its own territory.”106 
¶62 If the Court had taken the case and answered that question in the negative, major 
corporations might have breathed a huge sigh of relief.  But not necessarily; in theory the 
Court could have answered that question, “No,” but still agreed with Judge Reinhardt that 
accomplice liability under the ATS is governed instead by federal common law doctrines 
of joint venture, agency and reckless disregard.  In that outcome, the corporations might 
merely have hopped from the frying pan into the fire, because Reinhardt’s theories are 
sometimes easier to prove than aiding and abetting.107 
¶63 If the Court had gone further and joined Judge Korman in altogether ruling out 
corporate liability under the ATS for human rights violations overseas, corporations 
might have breathed even more freely.  Yet they still would not have been entirely home 
free.  Corporate executives might still be held liable for aiding and abetting.  If the Court 
exempted corporations from liability, and stopped there, without reaching the question of 
or defining standards for aiding and abetting by other ATS defendants, then corporate 
executives would be left holding the bag of uncertainties.  However, assuming that 
                                                 
103 Id. at 292, 321-26, 332-33 (Korman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
104 See Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254 (2d Cir. 2007), cert. filed sub nom. American 
Isuzu Motors Inc. v. Ntsebeza, aff’d for lack of quorum, 2008 U.S. LEXIS 3868 (May 12, 2008).,    
105 The other two questions proposed by petitioners involve separation of powers, political questions, 
international comity, and the U.S. statute implementing the Genocide Convention.  Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari at i, American Isuzu Motors Inc. v. Ntsebeza, No. 07-919 (U.S. Jan. 11, 2008).  None of these 
questions would require the Court to clarify the issues discussed in the text above.   
106 Id. at i(2); Brief for the U.S. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 6, 16-18, in American Isuzu 
Motors Inc. v. Ntsebeza, aff’d for lack of quorum, 2008 U.S. LEXIS 3868 (May 12, 2008). The U.S. 
explained that whereas the Court of Appeals “left open” the possibility of the district court on remand 
dismissing the case on foreign policy grounds, the appeals court held “categorically” that aiding and 
abetting may be pleaded under the ATS.  Id. at 6. 
107 For example, in Unocal the majority found merely a triable issue as to whether Unocal aided and abetted 
the use of forced labor by the Burmese army in clearing the path for Unocal’s pipeline.  Doe I v. Unocal 
Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 952 (9th Cir. 2002) (subsequent history truncated).  Yet the fact that the army acted as 
an agent of the project of which Unocal was a part of was, by comparison, relatively straightforward.  Id. at 
938, 972-974 (Reinhardt, J., concurring). 
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corporations indemnify their executives from such liability, the corporations would have 
to pick up their bags. In defending their executives in court, they would face the still 
unanswered questions about the source and scope of aiding and abetting liability.  Only 
the financial stakes would be lower, since juries are not likely to award damages against 
corporate executives as large as against the corporations themselves.108 
¶64 As of this writing, however, controversies persist over three main questions relating 
to corporate liability for aiding and abetting under the ATS: (1) Whether corporations can 
be held liable at all under the ATS; (2) If so, whether the law governing their liability for 
aiding and abetting is international law or federal common law; and (3) Whether the 
standard of liability for aiding and abetting is based on a knowledge test, as in 
Furundzija, or a purpose test, as in article 25 (3) (c) of the ICC Statute.  This article now 
turns to those questions. 
C. Whether Corporations Can Be Held Liable for Aiding and Abetting 
¶65 Although academic commentators raised the point earlier,109 Judge Korman’s 
partially dissenting opinion in the Second Circuit’s 2007 ruling in the apartheid litigation 
appears to be the first time an appellate judge has opined that corporations cannot be held 
liable for aiding and abetting under the ATS.110  His argument comes down to the 
proposition that since international law does not impose criminal responsibility on 
corporations, and since U.S. courts rely on international criminal law to find a customary 
international law basis for ATS jurisdiction, there can be no ATS jurisdiction over 
corporate defendants.111 
¶66 As noted in the preceding section, Judge Korman is correct that current 
international criminal law does not generally impose international criminal responsibility 
on corporations.  But the principal reason, as noted above, is not a peculiar reluctance to 
hold corporations criminally accountable for violating international norms.  Rather the 
main reason is that the domestic legal systems of many States do not provide for criminal 
responsibility of legal persons for violating any law.  
¶67 There is no comparable problem, however, in holding corporations civilly 
accountable to pay money damages for violations of norms.  I am not aware of any legal 
system in which corporations cannot be sued for damages when they commit legal 
wrongs that would be actionable if committed by an individual. Indeed, as discussed 
above,112 several widely ratified treaties in the last decade express a preference for States 
to impose criminal liability on corporations that aid and abet violations, but where that is 
not possible, require States at least to impose proportional civil or administrative liability. 
¶68 Nor is international law hostile to requiring vindication of violations of 
international norms by payment of money damages.  On the contrary, customary 
international law has long held that injuries caused by violations of international norms 
require reparation, including monetary compensation when full restitution is not 
                                                 
108 See Lippmann, supra note 16, at 176-77. 
109 Curtis. A. Bradley, Jack L. Goldsmith & David H. Moore, Sosa, Customary International Law, and the 
Continuing Relevance of Erie, 120 HARV. L. REV. 869, 924-29 (2007). 
110 Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 292 (Korman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
111 Id. at 321-26. 
112 See supra Part II.E. 
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possible.113  Moreover, international law especially encourages broad reparations, 
including compensation, for victims of gross violations of international human rights and 
humanitarian law.114 
¶69 At present, the argument for holding corporations civilly liable in tort for violating 
international norms is thus strong, even if corporations cannot be prosecuted before 
international criminal tribunals.  But as Judge Korman rightly observes, the corporations 
that allegedly aided and abetted apartheid cannot be held to the present standard, because 
apartheid ended before the recent treaties were adopted.115  In the apartheid litigation, 
then, the question comes down to whether prohibitions on aiding and abetting are 
independent international criminal norms -- which corporations could not violate in the 
1980s -- or whether, in suits for money damages, aiding and abetting liability is merely 
an ancillary remedy against those who assisted perpetrators who could and did violate 
primary international norms. 
¶70 The answer, as recognized by the ICTR, is that aiding and abetting is not an 
“autonomous crime” under international law: 
the physical act which constitutes the act of complicity does not have its 
own inherent criminality, but rather it borrows the criminality of the act 
committed by the principal perpetrator . . . .  The accomplice has not 
committed an autonomous crime, but has merely facilitated the criminal 
enterprise committed by another.116 
The ICTY takes the same view: “As opposed to the ‘commission’ of a crime, aiding and 
abetting is a form of accessory liability.”117 
¶71 Citing both ICTR and the ICTY cases, Judge Katzmann, one of the judges in the 
majority in Khulumani, elaborated: 
Viewing aiding and abetting in this way, as a theory of identifying who 
was involved in an offense committed by another rather than as an offense 
in itself, also helps to explain why a private actor may be held responsible 
for aiding and abetting the violation of a norm that requires state action or 
action under color of law . . . . 
It is of no moment that a private actor . . . could not be held liable as a 
principal.118 
                                                 
113 E.g., see generally Factory at Chorzow, Jurisdiction, Judgment, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 8; Report of 
the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts (2001), G.A. Res. 56/83, Annex, Dec. 12, 2001, as corrected by UN Doc. 
A/56/49 (Vol. I)/Corr. 4, arts. 31, 34 and 36. 
114 Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation  for Victims of Gross 
Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law, 
G.A. Res. 60/147, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/147 (Dec. 16, 2005). 
115 Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 326. 
116 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, ICTR No. ICTR-96-4-T, Trial Chamber Judgment, ¶ 528 (Sept. 2, 1998). 
117 Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case Nos. IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T, Judgment, ¶ 391 (Feb. 22, 2001). 
118 Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 281. 
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¶72 For purposes of ATS law, as noted above, the United States as amicus unavailingly 
asked the Supreme Court to accept review of the following “question presented” in the 
apartheid litigation:119 “Whether a private defendant may be sued under the ATS for 
aiding and abetting a violation of international law by a foreign government in its own 
territory.”120 
¶73 As thus formulated, the question is far broader than merely that of whether 
corporations may be sued under ATS for aiding and abetting; it would encompass other 
“private defendants,” such as individual corporate executives, as well.  Yet as noted 
above,121 there has been no question since Nuremberg that corporate executives can be 
prosecuted for aiding and abetting international crimes.  For the Supreme Court to have 
given the answer sought by the defendant corporations and by the U.S. -- that private 
defendants cannot be sued under ATS for aiding and abetting -- the Court would have 
had to entertain a rationale even broader than the one employed by Judge Korman.   
¶74 Whatever the Court’s interpretation of domestic law, there is no international law 
basis for such a broader rationale.  The US argues as amicus that a basis in international 
relations is supplied by the risk that ATS suits against corporations for aiding and 
abetting will inevitably call into question the conduct of foreign governments on their 
own soil, thereby complicating U.S. foreign relations.122 
¶75 That policy concern, however, is best answered by case-by-case analysis, not by a 
blanket rejection of all ATS suits against corporations, let alone against all private 
defendants.  In some cases, such as the apartheid litigation, where both the South African 
and US governments protest the litigation, the “foreign relations” argument for dismissal, 
whether based on deference to the Executive or on international comity toward the 
foreign government, may well be strong. 
¶76 But in other cases -- such as Unocal, where the foreign government was the 
murderous military dictatorship in Burma -- the argument makes no sense.  The best 
approach is to continue with the case-by-case approach to assessing foreign policy 
impacts, left intact by the Court in Sosa.123 
D. Whether the ATS Standard for Aiding and Abetting Should be Taken from 
International Law or from Federal Common Law, and Whether It Is a Knowledge or a 
Purpose Test 
¶77 Sosa clarified that under ATS, international law supplies the jurisdictional basis, 
but the cause of action is then created (or not) as a matter of federal common law.124 
Judge Hall, concurring in Khulumani, confesses that “Sosa at best lends Delphian 
guidance on the question of whether the federal common law or customary international 
                                                 
119 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, American Isuzu Motors Inc. v. Lungisile Ntsebeza, aff’d for lack of 
quorum, 2008 U.S. LEXIS 3868 (May 12, 2008); Brief for the U.S. as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Petitioners, id. at 6, 16-18.   
120 Brief for the U.S. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, id. at 6, 16-18. 
121 See supra Part II.A. 
122 Brief for the Petitioners, at 12-14, 18-22, American Isuzu Motors Inc., No. 07-919. 
123 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 730 n.21 (2004). 
124 Id. at 712 (jurisdictional statute), 724 (common law causes of action). 
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law represents the proper source from which to derive a standard of aiding and abetting 
liability under the ATCA.”125 
¶78 I concur. However, if the Supreme Court in some future case were to agree with 
Judges Katzmann and Korman that the ATS test for aiding and abetting is to be taken 
from international law, then three points made in the discussion of international law 
above should still be borne in mind.  First, the weight of international law authority 
supports the “knowledge” test adopted by the ICTY.  Second, even under the ICC 
Statute, the international law test is not the simple “purpose” test found by Judge 
Katzmann in one clause of the ICC Statute. Not only article 25 (3) (c) with its purpose 
test, but also article 25 (3) (d), which includes a knowledge test for persons who assist 
group crimes, should be used where applicable.  And third, as noted above, the word 
“purpose” in the ICC statute must be interpreted in light of the “object and purpose” of 
the treaty.  So interpreted, it would require only that criminality be a purpose, not the sole 
or even primary purpose.  Moreover, it would allow purpose in any event to be inferred 
from knowledge. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
¶79 The principal concern of major corporations about liability for aiding and abetting 
at present is the risk of being held liable in U.S. courts under ATS.  But whatever 
happens in current ATS litigation, the issue of aiding and abetting may become more 
important in the future in other contexts -- including the International Criminal Court, 
national courts in other home countries of major corporations, and national courts in 
developing countries where large companies do business.  If the standards were clarified 
for aiding and abetting, and especially for the mens rea element, the resulting legal 
certainty would be fairer for both corporate managers and victims of human rights 
violations, while avoiding needless sources of friction among states. 
¶80 If and when the Supreme Court does undertake to clarify whether private actors can 
be held liable for aiding and abetting under the ATS, the following principles of 
international law should be borne in mind.  First, even if corporations per se cannot be 
prosecuted before international criminal tribunals, corporate executives have long been 
subject to international criminal jurisdiction.  Second, international criminal law has long 
recognized criminal responsibility for aiding and abetting.  Third, at the present stage of 
development of international criminal law, civil liability in national courts of corporations 
which aid and abet violations of international criminal law is widely accepted and 
recognized by international law.  Fourth, international law increasingly encourages 
criminal prosecution in national courts of corporations which aid and abet violations of 
international criminal law.  Combining these principles, whatever may have been the 
status of corporate aiding and abetting liability in the apartheid era, international norms 
against corporate aiding and abetting of violations of international criminal law are now 
widely accepted internationally.  They are also defined with the requisite specificity, 
arguably under the knowledge test used by the ICTY and ICTR, but in any event 
certainly by the more demanding ICC test, which generally (but not always) requires a 
purpose to facilitate the crime. 
                                                 
125 Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 286 (2d Cir. 2007), aff’d for lack of quorum sub 
nom American Isuzu Motors Inc. v. Lungisile Ntsebeza, 2008 U.S. LEXIS 3868 (May 12, 2008). 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  J O U R N AL  O F  I N T E R N A T I O N A L  H U M A N  R I G H T S  [ 2 0 0 8  
 
 326
¶81 In short, aiding and abetting international human rights crimes by private actors, 
including corporations and their executives, satisfies the tests set forth by the Supreme 
Court in Sosa for recognition of common law tort claims under the ATS. 
